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I 
In some passages, Aristotle explicitly distinguishes between the cause of 
being and the cause of coming to be. In other passages, he speaks as if there 
were no such difference. One may consider the distinction as essential. The 
concern does not disappear if we render the Aristotelian aitia not as “cause”, 
as we conveniently do, but as “explanation” or “explanatory factor”. To ask 
why a is an F and to ask why a becomes an F seems to ask for different 
explanations. In consequence, one can arrive at the view that Aristotle 
confounds both causes or explanations. I intend to show that he does not. In 
doing so, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of why, for Aristotle, 
essence is a cause both of being and of coming to be.  
First, I will list the passages in Aristotle that distinguish between the cause 
of being and the cause of coming to be. Second, I will consider three passages 
where Aristotle seems, at first glance, to confound these two causes. Third, I 
will discuss Metaphysics Zeta 17 in detail, in order to show why both causes 
are unified in Aristotle’s concept of substance.  
Evidence for the distinction between the cause of being and the cause of 
coming to be can be found in at least two passages, Met. V 1, 1013a16–19 and 
Met. I 9, 991b3–4 (= XI 5, 1080a2–3). By discussing the various meanings of 
the term archê (“principle”) in Book V of the Metaphysics, Aristotle tells us 
that aitia has the same meanings as archê due to the fact that every aitia is an 
archê (1013a16–17). Principles, he adds, are primary either with respect to 
being, with respect to coming to be, or with respect to coming to know (a17–
19). Presumably, these aspects of being primary are not mutually exclusive. 
Something may be primary in several ways. For example, in Met. Zeta 1, 
1028a32–33, substance is primary in every aspect. Nonetheless, Aristotle takes 
it as relevant to distinguish principles of being from principles of coming to be 
in Met. V 1. It is reasonable to suppose that if principles are primary with 
respect to being or with coming to be, the same will hold for causes. Hence the 
passage can be read as evidence for the distinction between both causes.  
Explicitly, the distinction appears in Met. I 9, 991b3–4 (= XI 5, 1080a2–
3) where Aristotle criticizes Plato’s concept of causation. He reads the Phaedo 
as rendering Forms both as a cause of being and of coming to be (tou einai kai 
tou gignesthai aitia). This reading seems to be echoed in Met. Zeta 8, 1033b28, 
where Aristotle claims the uselessness of Platonic Forms to explain coming to 
be and being. So much for the appearance of the distinction in Aristotle. 
Metaphysics Zeta 17 will be considered later. 
  
II 
The idea that Aristotle confuses both causes may arise from three 
passages: Met. V 18, 1022a14–20, again Met. I 9, 991b3–4 (= XI 5, 1080a2–
3), and De gen. et corr. 333b7–16. I shall discuss them in that order.  
In Met. V 18, Aristotle considers the various uses of the phrase kath’ ho 
and kath’ hauto. He says that the phrase kath’ ho is coextensive with the term 
aition. In general, if A is in virtue of (kath’ ho) B, then B is a cause (aition) of 
A.1
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This seems to be simple.  However, is being in virtue of B the same 
relation as coming to be in virtue of B? Here, it sounds as though Aristotle 
neglects the distinction.  
A further look confirms this. He starts by presenting two ways in which 
“in virtue of” (kath’ ho) is said. First, things are said to be in virtue of form and 
substance, as the good thing is said to be in virtue of the good itself (auto 
agathon, 1022a16). Second, things are said to come to be in virtue of an 
underlying thing (pephyke gignesthai, a16). For example, color is in virtue of 
the surface where the color appears. In the first way, things are said to be in 
virtue of form, in the second, things are said to be in virtue of matter (1022a17–
19).  
His first example is unambiguous: the cause of being is at stake. The good 
thing is good in virtue of the good itself. F–ness is the cause of o’s being an F. 
This sounds Platonic, and it is indeed, as can be seen in the earlier Platonic 
dialogues. There is one form of virtue by which (di’ ho) all virtuous things are 
virtuous (Meno, 72c7–8, see also 72e5: tô autô eidei). In the same way, there 
is one form of piety by which all pious things are pious (Eutyphro 6d10–11). 
Now, goodness is not the cause of Socrates’ being what he is as such, i.e., a 
human being. He is a human being in virtue of human–ness, animal–ness, and 
two–footed–ness. These three are causes of being a human being, as Aristotle 
explicitly says in 1022a33–35. In short, form is the cause of a thing’s being a 
substance.  
In another way, Aristotle tells us, color is said to be in virtue of an 
underlying surface (pephyke gignesthai, a16). We must not infer from the mere 
appearance of the Greek verb gignesthai that coming to be is at stake. Aristotle 
does not say that a color comes to be owing to matter. Rather, he says that color 
always appears on an underlying surface. One may infer from this fact that 
matter is needed for a color’s coming to be, but Aristotle is not explicit about 
this inference. As far as this passage is concerned, the question of whether the 
cause of coming to be is considered or not is in limbo.  
Nonetheless, Aristotle adds a general conclusion: the term kath’ hauto is 
equivalent with aition. In this passage it sounds as if an aition is but a cause of 
being an F. But such a restriction is far from Aristotle’s general doctrine. Thus, 
even though the cause of a substance’s coming to be has not been brought up 
here, it must be included.  
 
III 
The second passage worth considering is Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s 
concept of cause. Aristotle distinguishes twice between the cause of being and 
the cause of coming to be. But in his arguments against Plato, he seemingly 
does not.  
In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way—that the Forms are 
causes both of being and of coming to be. Yet when the Forms exist, still 
the things that share in them do not come into being unless there is an 
efficient cause. And many other things come to be (e.g., a house or a ring), 
of which we do not say that there are Forms. Clearly, therefore, even the 
220 / Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 11/ No. 21/ Fall & Winter 2017 
other things can both be and come to be owing to such causes just 
mentioned [and not owing to Forms]. [translation by Ross, modified]2  
Aristotle’s criticism of the Phaedo has much been discussed in the 
literature since it is not clear what type of cause he is taking aim at (e.g., 
whether he takes Forms as efficient or as formal causes). I propose not to 
consider this question, but to take Aristotle at his word. He says that in the 
Phaedo, Forms are rendered as the cause both of being and of coming to be 
(kai tou einai kai tou gignesthai aitia). Is this a correct reading of the Phaedo?  
When Socrates introduces his concern about causes, he first speaks of the 
cause of coming to be and perishing (95e9–96a1). However, a few lines later, 
he refers to the causes of coming to be, of perishing, and of being (96a8–10). 
This extension comes without fanfare.3 In Socrates’ later account, it is hard to 
decide whether Form as a cause should embrace both the cause of being and 
the cause of coming to be. His earlier reference to the explanations of 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras makes it probable that he has both causes in mind 
when talking about Forms and participation. But with one possible exception, 
all he explicitly says until 103b is that something is an F because of the Form 
F. Coming to be seems not to be considered. 
The exception is 100d7–8 and e2–3. Some manuscripts read that all the 
good things become good because of the Form of the good, some read that they 
are good.4 If we accept the reading that the good things become good because 
of the Form of the good, one may ask whether this must be taken in a physical 
sense. In 101b9–c1, Socrates talks about the reason why one and one become 
two (genesthai), and this phenomenon is not a generation in a physical sense. 
It is not a process.5  
We have to wait until 103a5–10 for a clear reference to coming to be. As 
Phaidon reports of the dialogue between Socrates and his friends, someone of 
the participants has noted that the discussion’s result seems to contradict with 
what has been said earlier. Socrates agrees, and the concern seems to be about 
the earlier discussion in 70d7–71a7. There, everything was said to come to be 
(gignesthai) from its contrary, e. g. the big from the small. This has proved 
impossible, Socrates sums up in 103c7–8.  
For this reason, I conclude, Aristotle may take it as obvious that physical 
change is at stake in the Phaedo. His objection to the Phaedo’s doctrine starts 
with a twofold argument that is restricted to coming to be. Nonetheless, he 
concludes that therefore (hôste dêlon) many things are and come to be not by 
virtue of Forms. In the first part of the argument, he shows Forms to be 
insufficient to explain coming to be. Forms are always there, physical objects 
are not. The latter do not come to be unless there is a moving principle. In the 
second part, he goes a step further by showing that Forms must be irrelevant 
for coming to be. Since many things come to be of which there are no Forms, 
Forms cannot be a necessary condition for coming to be. 
Here, it is indubitable that Aristotle is speaking about the coming to be of 
objects, as his example of a house makes clear. As Annas rightly sums up, the 
argument shows that “Forms are neither sufficient (a) nor necessary (b) for 
coming into being.”6 However, the argument’s purpose was to show that Forms 
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are neither causes of coming to be nor of being. Does the latter follow from the 
former?  
As Aristotle puts it in the passage quoted, he seems to think that the cause 
of a thing’s coming to be is also the cause of its being. However, he gives no 
hint of why we should agree with him. We have to search elsewhere for an 
explanation.  
 
IV 
The full relevance of the next passage will not become clear until we 
discuss Zeta 17. In that passage, Aristotle seems, when refuting Empedocles’ 
concept of nature, to ignore the difference between the cause of being and the 
cause of coming to be. He indifferently speaks of aition when replacing 
Empedocles’ concept of mixing by the concept of essence: 
Then, what is the cause determining that a human being comes to be from 
a human being, that wheat (instead of an olive tree) comes to be from wheat, 
either always or for the most part? And are we to say that a bone is what is put 
together in such and such manner? For nothing comes to be by being composed 
by chance, as he puts it, but by a certain account. What, then, is the cause of 
this? Fire and Water are none. But neither is it Love and Strife, the former is a 
cause of association only, and the latter only of dissociation. No: the cause in 
question is the substance of each thing, not merely “a combining and a divorce 
of what has been combined,” as he says. And chance, not account, is the name 
of these occurrences, for things are combined by chance here.[translation by 
Joachim, modified]7  
It is worth noting that the Greek noun mixis does not stand for mixture, 
but for mixing.8 Empedocles’ Fragment DK 8 shows us that he takes the mixing 
of elements as what people call nature, and the divorce of elements what they 
call death. Possibly, Empedocles’ concept of mixis is primarily intended to 
explain coming to be. However, as long as fire and water are mixed in a certain 
way, a bone is given. The elements’ mixing, then, were the cause of becoming 
a bone, the elements’ mixture the cause of being a bone.9 
Aristotle reads Empedocles’ concept of mixis as explaining both why a 
bone comes to be and what a bone is. First, he asks for an explanation of why 
a man always begets a man. Second, he asks whether the past mixing (ôdi 
syntethê) explains us what a bone is (note that the aorist syntethê refers to a 
process in the past).10 
By contrast, the Greek ousia can hardly signify a process, and Aristotle 
never speaks of “essentialization.” Nonetheless, he does not hesitate to replace 
Empedocles’ mixis by essence (as I translate ouisa here). Since essence is not 
a process, how can it be relevant to explain coming to be? As Aristotle puts it, 
essence is what guarantees the proper way of coming to be. Because of essence, 
a human being always begets a human being, not only sometimes and by 
chance. So understood, essence is a necessary condition for a natural process 
of coming to be. Moreover, essence in Aristotle is an object’s essence, that is, 
the cause of the object’s being this sort of thing. If essence guarantees that an 
olive tree grows out of a seed, and if essence is what an olive tree is in itself, 
the cause of being and the cause of coming to be are unified.  
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Again, Aristotle neither tells us that both causes are unified nor gives any 
hint why it holds. Since he does not prove that essence is indispensable to 
explain the process of natural coming to be, one might tend to take his 
reference to essence as a dodge to elegantly merge both causes. My purpose is 
not to discharge Aristotle from such an accusation. Whether essence must be a 
cause of coming to be goes far beyond the scope of my considerations. 
However, we see why Aristotle speaks indiscriminately of the aition of natural 
objects with respect to essence. If a thing’s essence is the cause of the thing’s 
coming to be, it is both the cause of being and the cause of coming to be. But 
these matters will not become clear until we consider Zeta 17. 
 
V 
Before I turn to Zeta 17, 1041a20–b9, I shall offer a general claim. With 
respect to Aristotle’s theory of definition in Ana. post. II 8–10, one might 
suppose that my concern is much ado about nothing. According to this theory, 
an adequate definition of what something is explains why it is. For example, 
the definition of thunder explains why it thunders. Definition and explanation 
are interrelated because the middle term of the explaining syllogism is the 
event’s essence. Thus, being and coming to be are interwoven. In consequence, 
essence is both a cause of being and of coming to be.  
Even though Aristotle’s discussion of explanatory definitions is mostly 
restricted to natural events, such as thunder or an eclipse, he seems to extend 
this method to substances, too (Ana. post. II 8, 93a22–24). However, the result 
of Ana. post. II 8–10 does not work for substances without modifications, as 
Charles already has noted.11 Charles takes Aristotle to stay "as close as 
possible” to the method of Ana. post. later in Zeta 17.12 However, that isn’t 
close at all, as we will see. As Charles rightly points out, the concepts of form 
and matter do not appear in Ana. post. II 8–10.13 But this is only half of the 
difference between Ana. post. and Zeta 17. An object’s form, as it appears in 
Zeta 17, is identical with the object’s end and this identification goes back to 
Physics II 7. All we get in Ana. post. is the idea that form is one of four 
explanatory factors. The end of coming to be has no relevance for an adequate 
definition of thunder. Hence, in order to interpret Zeta 17 adequately we should 
rather consider Physics II, 7–9 than Ana. post. II 8–10.14 
Here is the relevant passage of Zeta 17 at full length (the most important 
part will be (ii)): 
(i)  However, one could ask why a human being is such a kind of animal. 
It is clear that this is not to ask why one who is a human being is a human 
being. So what one asks is why it is that one thing belongs to another. (It must 
be evident that it does belong, otherwise nothing is being asked at all.) For 
example, why does it thunder, that means, why a noise is produced in the 
clouds? In this manner, what is sought is one thing predicated of another. And 
why are these things, e.g., bricks and stones, a house? It is clear, then, that what 
is sought is the cause, and this is the essence, logically speaking.  
(ii) In some cases, the cause it the end (as presumably in the case of a 
house or a bed), while in some cases it is the moving principle. For this latter 
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is also a cause. But such a cause is sought with respect to coming to be and 
ceasing to be, while the former is sought also with respect to being.  
(iii) Most of all, in cases where things are not predicated one of another, 
one does not recognize what is sought. This happens, e.g., when it is asked 
what a human being is, because the question is simply put and does not 
distinguish these things as being that. But we must articulate our question 
before we ask it, otherwise we shall have a case of asking both something and 
nothing. And since the existence of the thing must already be given, it is clear 
that the question must be why matter is so-and-so. For instance, why are these 
things here a house? Because it holds what being is for a house. And why is 
this thing a human being, or why is this body in this state? So what is sought 
is the cause (this is the form) by which matter is a certain thing. And that is 
substance. [translation by Bostock, modified]15  
For the first time in Zeta, the end of coming to be appears. The so called 
final cause enters the discussion of substance. Aristotle starts this last chapter 
of Zeta by claiming that substance is a cause and a principle. Generally, he 
adds, searching for the reason why means to ask why this holds of that.16 What 
follows in 1041a11–b7 can be read as an exemplification of what it means to 
ask this way. In b7–8 Aristotle concludes that by asking why this holds of that, 
we search for the cause by which matter is a certain thing, e. g., a house or a 
human being.  
If we ignore section (ii) for a moment, he seems to confuse the cause of 
being with the cause of coming to be. In (i), he starts with the claim that one 
has to ask why this animal is a human being (a21) and, generally, why this 
holds of that (a23). In both cases, being, not generation, appears to be at stake. 
The same holds for the case of the house in a27: the question is why stones and 
bricks are a house; not, why a house comes to be. In contrast, the example in 
a25 asks why noise comes to be (gignetai) in the clouds. Aristotle switches 
from the question of being to the question of coming to be and back again. In 
(iii), to ask why this body is a human being does not ask for coming to be. 
Finally, Aristotle merges all these questions as being a question about matter 
(b7–8), and matter has to do with coming to be. In sum, both causes seem to 
be confounded.  
But section (ii) changes everything. First, it explicitly distinguishes 
between the question of being and the question of coming to be. Second, it 
distinguishes between items such as thunder and houses. Third, it explains 
what sort of cause explains both an object’s being and coming to be: the end. 
I shall add some words to my reading of tinos heneka in a29 as “the end” 
or "the purpose”. Leunissen argues for a different meaning of the Arisotelian 
phrases to hou heneka and to heneka tinos. Only the former designates an end, 
the latter the relation “that this is for the sake of something.”17 From a 
grammatical point of view, one may agree with her interpretation. Moreover, 
one could say that this relation fits well with Aristotle’s general formula dia ti 
hyparchei ti kata tinos a few lines before (a23). Nonetheless, I take the 
distinction to make little sense in the context of Zeta. The tinos heneka is said 
to be a cause (a28 & 30: aition) and the cause at stake is substance in the sense 
of form. By no means is the Aristotelian form a relation. Thus, the phrase 
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cannot stand for the "relation as such”, as Leunissen puts it. Aristotle explicitly 
identifies the tinos heneka with form and substance (1041b9 & Physics II 8, 
199a30–32; in 200a33, he speaks of the aitia hê tinos heneka). As far as I can 
see, the best way for rendering the Greek tinos heneka remains to translate it 
as the end or purpose of coming to be in order to preserve the idea that form is 
at stake.18 
It is worth reading Aristotle’s words in section (ii) carefully. He speaks 
but of one single cause (aition). In the case of a house or a bed, this cause is 
the end, in the case of events such as thunder, it is the moving principle. 
Remarkably, he adds that the latter is “also” (kai) a cause. Why this? The 
reason seems to come immediately after. The moving principle is the cause we 
are seeking for when we ask for the reason of coming to be. All we need to 
explain thunder is to give its cause of coming to be. If there is a cause of 
thunder’s being, it is either irrelevant or already given by reference to the 
moving principle. But why there is such a difference between thunder and 
houses?  
One might want to reason that thunder and eclipses are "natural 
processes” (as Charles has put it), human beings and houses substances. But 
neither Ana. post. II 8–10 nor Zeta 17 make such a distinction. Moreover, as 
many commentators read Physics II 8, Aristotle renders natural processes such 
as rain as being for the sake of something. Why, then, do we seek for the 
moving principle in the case of thunder and for the end in the case of houses, 
as we are told in Zeta 17?19 
What we can take for granted is this. The house’s end, that is, its purpose 
explains both why these bricks and stones are a house and why they came to 
be a house. By contrast, the moving principle explains what thunder is by 
explaining why it thunders. The reason for this difference might be that thunder 
and an eclipse do not persist in the way houses and human beings do. But no 
such difference is offered by Aristotle. All he says is that we seek for different 
causes in the case of thunder and houses.20 
One might reason that in the case of substances, the moving principle and 
the end are unified in the form what would render a clear distinction between 
both causes as inappropriate.21 However, both causes are one because the end 
is but essence and parent and offspring are the same in essence, as Aristotle 
explains. This unification does not forbid us to distinguish between the moving 
principle and the end as two different causes, as Aristotle does in Zeta 17 since 
he is concerned with different objects.22 
The remarkable point in Zeta 17 is that either the moving principle or the 
end are said to be the cause. Aristotle is no longer seeking for a distinction of 
different causes or explanations as he does elsewhere (see e.g., Physics II 3, 
194b16–195a4 = Met. V 2, 1013a24–b6; Ana. post. II 11, 94a20–b26), but for 
one specific cause (aitia tis, 1041a9–10; to aition, 1041b7). Substance is the 
cause by which matter is a certain thing (1041b7–8). It is the only cause we are 
seeking for in search of substance (1041a27–28). My emphasis of Aristotle’s 
talk of one single cause (which is substance) does not rely on an assumption 
that he distinguishes between aitia and aition, which can be ruled out.23 Rather, 
it relies on the fact that according to 1041a28–32, in some cases, the cause is 
Aristotle on the Cause of Being and...   / 225 
 
 
the end and in some cases, it is the moving principle. The plurality of causes, 
as it appears elsewhere, has become irrelevant. 
For this reason, I think, we can rule out Frede/Patzig’s reading of the 
passage. Against the majority of commentators, they hold that both the moving 
principle and the end only refer to coming to be and perishing, and that the 
essence mentioned in 1041a28 is what also refers to a thing’s being. My 
objections are these. First, as we can see in Physics II 7, 198b2–11, the end is 
essence, and this equation is pondered even by Frede/Patzig a few lines before 
in their commentary. Second, Aristotle does not discuss here what types of 
causes can be worked out with respect to coming to be and being, as 
Frede/Patzig put it. He is searching for the cause that makes matter this sort of 
thing.24 
Substance, then, is both the cause of being and the cause of coming to be. 
There is no need to distinguish between both causes. Inasmuch as substance 
explains why some matter is a certain thing, it also explains the matter’s 
coming to be this thing.  
But should we take the latter claim for granted? Does substance really 
explain why these bricks and stones became a house? It does, when we take 
the end to be substance, as Aristotle teaches us in 1041a29. What we get in 
Zeta 17 is a remarkable shift away from the method in Ana. post. II 8–10.  
In Ana. post. II 8–10, the question of why it thunders is explained by the 
extinction of fire. In a similar way, one might explain that bricks and stones 
come to be a house because a housebilder is putting them together. However, 
this is not the way Aristotle proceeds in Zeta 17. The housebuilder as the 
moving principle of a house is completely irrelevant in Zeta 17, and the same 
holds for Eta 2–3, as we will see. Thus, the focus in Ana. post. is on the moving 
principle, but in Zeta 17, it is on the end.25 
This shift, I believe, can only be explained on the basis of Physics II 7–9. 
This is where Aristotle identifies form and essence with the end of coming to 
be. With respect to Physics II, the specification of the cause in Zeta 17 is no 
surprise. At the end of Physics II 9, Aristotle tells us that the end (tinos heneka) 
is most of all a cause because it is the cause of matter (aition tês hylês, 200a33). 
The purpose of a saw (namely sawing) defines the shape and the material that 
is needed. This fits well with the two claims of Zeta 17 that substance is the 
cause of matter and that the end is the cause of being and coming to be. What 
we need to understand Aristotle’s discussion of cause in Zeta 17 is not Ana. 
post. II 8–10 but Physics II 7–9. 
 
VI 
However, the discussion on substance has not finished at the end of book 
Zeta. It continues in book Eta. I shall show also in Eta 2 and 3, the definition 
of a house refers to the end of coming to be and neglects the moving principle. 
Aristotle continues where he ended in Zeta 17. According to Charles, a house 
is now defined thus: “What it is to be a house [i.e., being arranged in a given 
way] belongs to matter of this type.”26 Then, the arrangement of the material 
were the house’s essence. But as we will see, the house’s purpose is its essence. 
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With respect to the question of what essence is, Eta 2 and 3 stay close to Zeta 
17.27 
The discussion of Eta 2 is concerned with perceptible substances. Specific 
differences explain what a perceptible thing is. Ice, for example, is water being 
solified in a certain manner, a threshold is defined by its position, a wind by its 
direction and place, and a house by bricks and stones being arranged in a 
certain way (1042b15–25 & 1043a7–10). All we need to explain a thing’s 
being, it seems, is matter and difference.  
However, Aristotle warns us not to take such differences as substance. 
They are but what is analogous to substance (homôs to analogon en hekastô, 
1043a4–5). It is hard to explain why this holds. Ross has offered the reason 
that these differences do not fall into the category of substance. This is 
disputable on the basis of Topics I 4, 101b19–20, where the difference is 
included in the class of genus.28 I shall try to offer a better reason.  
First, we have seen that mixture is not substance because mixture is an 
arrangement by chance. Thus, in the case of ice, the arrangement itself does 
not explain why water always freezes to ice, that is, why water is always 
arranged this way when it gets cold. In the same manner, the arrangement of 
the four elements in a human body does not explain why a human being always 
begets a human being. Hence, substance must be different from proportion and 
arrangement. The latter is rather a result of substance.29 
There is a second reason why the arrangement is not the cause we are 
searching for. It does not meet the demands of Zeta 17 for being the aition that 
explains both coming to be and being. The arrangement of a house does not 
explain why a house has been built. And the arrangement of the water 
molecules does not explain why water solidifies this way. By contrast, the 
extinction of fire sufficiently explains why it thunders. Here, the moving 
principle is all we need, since it answers both the question what thunder is and 
why it happens. What, in the case of a substance does explain both what it is 
and why it came to be? Only the end.30 
Unsurprisingly, thus, Aristotle comes back to the end as essence in Eta 2. 
Charles meets this fact by concluding that “[t]he example of the house, so 
understood, parallels that of thunder. As the latter is noise in the clouds caused 
by fire being quenched, a house will be bricks and stones (matter) arranged in 
a given way for the sake of protection.”31 I see no parallel here. In the case of 
thunder, the definition in Ana. post. mentions but the moving principle. In the 
case of a house, the definition in Eta mentions matter, the arrangement, and 
the purpose. As we learnt in Zeta 17, the end is essence, not the difference, as 
many commentators seem to read Eta 2. The one cause of a house’s being and 
coming to be is the purpose of a house. It explains both what a house is and 
why bricks and stones have to be arranged in a certain way in order to build a 
house.  
Why, then, is the difference at stake in Eta 2? Aristotle’s explicit purpose 
is to clarify substance in the sense of actualization (energeia ousia, 1042b10–
11), but the result is dubious. In 1043a12, he sums up that the actualization and 
the account of each thing differ due to the difference of matter. This seems to 
assume that the actualization and essence of a thing is the specific difference. 
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However, what follows from a14 on is a different line of reasoning. As often, 
Aristotle reminds us that there are various ways to define an object. With 
respect to the potentiality of a house, it is defined as bricks and stones, he says, 
with respect to the actualization, it is defined as a shelter for goods and stuff. 
Here, the actualization is not taken as the arrangement of the bricks and stones, 
but as the purpose of the house. The arrangement as the constitutive difference 
is no longer mentioned.32 
How can both aspects, the purpose and the difference, be brought 
together? The beginning of Eta 3 repeats the claim that the purpose is the 
actualized substance we are searching for (1043a32-33). This, then, can be 
taken for granted. However, Aristotle adds another way of defining a house, 
namely by considering the composite substance. In this respect, a house is “a 
shelter made of bricks and stones arranged in such and such manner” 
(1043a31–32). Since he immediately adds that the purpose is the actualization, 
one may conclude the following. The potential house is matter, the house 
actualized is the purpose, and the composite substance is the purpose combined 
with matter and the difference. In order to get a shelter out of bricks and stones, 
they need to be arranged in a certain way. The arrangement is needed to 
achieve the purpose. This result has an obvious parallel in Physics II 9. There, 
a saw’s teeth must be made of a certain shape in order to fulfill the purpose of 
sawing (200b1–8).  
If we accept the idea that the end is the cause of the arrangement and of 
matter (as it is said in Physics II 9, 200a33), we see why the purpose is added 
in the definition of a house in Eta 3. The definition goes beyond Zeta 7–9 
where the end is never mentioned, but it is in line with Zeta 17.  
The arrangement of matter just explains why these bricks and stones are 
a house but it does not explain why this house came to be. The purpose does 
both. Substance as the purpose or end explains why this sort of matter becomes 
a certain thing and it also explains what it is to be this sort of thing. Thus, I 
conclude the following. Aristotle’s idea that substance is both the cause of 
being and of coming to be relies on the fact that the end explains both. He 
identifies form and essence with the end and renders the end to be the cause of 
matter.  
I shall add a final word on Eta. When Charles discusses the ending of Eta 
6, 1045b18–19, he interprets the shape (morphê) which is said to be actuality 
as “presumably, being two-footed” (Chalmers, 2000: 295). Due to the doubt 
of authenticity given in manuscript Π Jaeger has put the whole final section 
1045b17–23 into double brackets. If these are Aristotle’s own words, we 
should read the Greek morphê, I recommend, as having the same meaning as 
eidos (see evidence for the equation e. g. Physics II 1, 193a31–32 & b18–20). 
Whether form (which is contrasted with matter here in 1045b18) should be 
read as the dialectic two–footedness or as the coming to be’s end depends on 
what Aristotle has in mind. The Greek eidos and morphê are rather vague 
container words in Aristotle as we have seen by his specification of form as 
the end in Physics II, and much the same can be said with respect to the 
specification of soul as form in De anima II 1. The vagueness of eidos is why 
he puts that much energy into the discussion of substance as form in Zeta.  
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By no means did I intend to give an account of Aristotle’s conception of 
form. However, what I think is clear now is why substance is both the cause of 
being and of coming to be in Aristotle. There is no confusion in his discussion. 
But as often, his explanations are terse and rough.  
 
 
Notes 
1. 1022a19–22: ὅλως δὲ τὸ καθ’ ὃ ἰσαχῶς καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρξει. Ross reads the 
relation thus: “the καθ’ ὃ has meanings answering to those of ‘cause’,” Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross, 2 
vols. (Oxford 1924, repr. 1958), vol. i, 333. Kirwan proposes to translate the Greek 
κατα as “by,” e.g., “Callias is good by (virtue of) good itself,” see his notes in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Books Γ, Δ, and Ε, Translated with Notes by C. Kirwan 
(Oxford 1971), 168. 
2.  991b3–9 = 1080a2–8: ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ 
γίγνεσθαι αἴτια τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν· καίτοι τῶν εἰδῶν ὄντων ὅμως οὐ γίγνεται τὰ μετέχοντα 
ἂν μὴ ᾖ τὸ κινῆσον, καὶ πολλὰ γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὔ φαμεν 
εἴδη εἶναι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ τἆλλα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας 
αἰτίας οἵας καὶ τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν. 1080a8 additionally reads ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ τὰ εἴδη at the 
end, which improves the conclusion’s sense.  
3.95e9–96a1: ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν 
διαπραγματεύσασθαι. 96a8–10: ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας 
ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι.  
4. The decisive phrase in 100d7–8 and e2–3 is τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά. 
According to Burnet’s edition, manuscripts T and b read the γίγνεται in d7–8, B and W 
do not (where b is a correcting hand in manuscript B). For e2–3, T and W read the 
γίγνεται, but B, again, does not. Hence, Burnet puts the Greek γίγνεται into brackets in 
both lines. The edition of Strachan has reworked the stemma and omits γίγνεται in d8 
in accordance with the manuscripts TPQV. In e3, however, Strachan reads γίγνεται in 
accordance with the manuscripts WPQVA. By contrast, Rowe’s edition reads γίγνεται 
in d8, but not in e3. In short, there is no consensus in the editions. 
5. This reservation has already been made by Annas: “Plato does, it is true, continue 
to use the language of coming-to-be; thus at 101c3-7 we are told that Forms explain 
not only things’ being one or two in number, but their becoming so. But of course they 
do not; what they explain is the possession of a quality, not the causal history of how 
that quality came to be possessed.” J. Annas “Aristotle on Inefficient Causes,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 32, 129 (1982), 311–326, 318. 
6. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Books M and N, Translated with Introduction and Notes 
by J. Annas (Oxford 1976), 162. 
7. 333b7–16: Τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ 
ἐκ τοῦ πυροῦ πυρὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐλαίαν· ἢ καὶ ἐὰν ὡδὶ συντεθῇ ὀστοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως 
ἔτυχε συνελθόντων οὐδὲν γίνεται, καθ’ ἃ ἐκεῖνός φησιν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινί. Τί οὖν τούτων 
αἴτιον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε ἢ γῆ. ̓Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· συγκρίσεως γὰρ ̔τὸ 
μέν ̓, τὸ δὲ διακρίσεως αἴτιον. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου, ἀλλ’ οὐ «μόνον μίξις 
τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων», ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνός φησιν. Τύχη δ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀνομάζεται, ἀλλ’ 
οὐ λόγος· ἔστι γὰρ μιχθῆναι ὡς ἔτυχεν.  
8. Translators sometimes render the Greek μίξις as mixture, see e.g. Kirwan’s 
Translation of Met. V 4, 1015a2. However, the LSJ correctly offers but “mixing” and 
“mingling”. 
9. Ross offers a remarkable note on this point. He claims: "It is clear that Aristotle 
interprets φύσις in Empedocles as = permanent nature.”, see Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Aristotle on the Cause of Being and...   / 229 
 
 
vol. i, 297. Ross refers to Met. V 4 where Aristotle renders Empedocles’ words as a 
claim about essence. Again, with respect to De gen. et corr. 333b7–16, Ross holds that 
φύσις in Empedocles is interpreted by οὐσία, permanent nature.” With respect to De 
gen. et corr. 414b17, he takes it as unclear. I suppose that consequently, Ross took 
Aristotle to read Empedokles’ mixis as "mixture” since the process of mixing can 
hardly be considered as a thing’s permanent nature. 
10. In Met. I 10, 993a15–24, Aristotle praises Empedocles for hinting at the thing’s 
essence. This shows us that he reads Empedocles’ mixis at least as the cause of being. 
Williams has claimed that Aristotle takes Empedocles’ concept of mixing merely as 
“juxtaposition [...] as when rubbish is hurled together in a refuse dip,” Aristotle’s De 
generatione et corruptione, Translated with notes by C. J. F. Williams (Oxford 1982), 
171. Indeed, according to Aristotle’s presentation, Empedocles’ focus solely lies on 
the proportion of the components and not on the question of how the composition is 
made. 
11. D. Charles Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford 2000), 283–294; 
“Definition and Explanation in the Posterior Analytics (and beyond)” in D. Charles 
(ed.) Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford 2010), 286–328, from now on 
abbreviated as [Defintion], esp. 309–313. 
12.  [Definition], 312–313. 
13. [Definition], 309. 
14. I disagree with Ferejohn’s judgment that “…I maintain that in the Physics 
Aristotle in effect replaces his earlier logical concept of an essence with the physical 
concept of nature,” M. Ferejohn Formal Causes. Definition, Explanation, and Primacy 
in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought (Oxford 2013), 162. As he puts it, essence does 
not “play a major role in the Physics,” 161. On the contrary, it does, if we consider 
Aristotle’s specification of essence as the end, see Physics II 7, 198b2–11. 
15. 1041a20–b9: ζητήσειε δ’ ἄν τις διὰ τί ἅνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον τοιονδί. τοῦτο μὲν 
τοίνυν δῆλον, ὅτι οὐ ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὅς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν· τὶ ἄρα κατά τινος 
ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὑπάρχει (ὅτι δ’ ὑπάρχει, δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲν ζητεῖ), 
οἷον διὰ τί βροντᾷ· διὰ τί ψόφος γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν· ἄλλο γὰρ οὕτω κατ’ ἄλλου 
ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον. καὶ διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν· φανερὸν τοίνυν 
ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἴτιον· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ’ ἐνίων μέν ἐστι 
τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἴσως ἐπ’ οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον· αἴτιον γὰρ 
καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ ὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἴτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, 
θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι. λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν τοῖς μὴ κατ’ 
ἀλλήλων λεγομένοις, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστι ζητεῖται διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ 
διορίζειν ὅτι τάδε τόδε. ἀλλὰ δεῖ διαρθρώσαντας ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, κοινὸν τοῦ μηθὲν 
ζητεῖν καὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν τι γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ 
ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί ἐστιν· οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί· ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὃ ἦν οἰκίᾳ εἶναι. καὶ 
ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ’ 
ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ᾧ τί ἐστιν· τοῦτο δ’ ἡ οὐσία.  
16. Leunissen reads this formula as a general rule for explanation which has relevance 
for a correct understanding of the Analytics’ method. See M. Leunissen Explanation 
and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature (Cambridge 2010), 186. Her discussion 
is part of the sixth chapter of her monograph, which forms a slightly modified version 
of her earlier work “The Structure of Teleological Explanations in Aristotle: Theory 
and Practice,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33 (2007), 145–178. My later 
references will be to her monograph, abbreviated as [Explanation]. 
17. [Explanations], 188. 
18. There is a deeper concern I have to skip here. As long as we read the Aristotelian 
aitia/aition as "explanation” (as Leunissen and many other do) we have to admit that 
substance in the sense of form and essence is but an explanation or explanatory factor. 
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This, I suppose, violates the standard reading of Aristotle’s concept of substance in 
Zeta. 
19. Also the latest contribution to the dispute on Physik II 8 argues for this reading, 
see M. Scharle 'Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8’ in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008), 147-183. According to Charles, Ana. post. 99b33–34 
refers to the idea that thunder is for the sake of threating those in Hades, see his 
[Definition], 293. However, there is no such idea in Ana. post. 
20. It might appear that Ross’ has already offered a modest version of my reading. 
He writes: "On the other hand we may ask not only for what purpose has so–and–so 
come into being or ceased to be, but also for what purpose it exists.”, see his Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics vol. ii, 223. However, he reads the passage as though we can either ask 
for coming to be or for both coming to be and being with respect to one and the same 
object. As I read it, we ask for the coming to be with respect to thunder and both for 
the coming to be and being with respect to houses. 
21. See Physics II 7, 198a24–27. Even though Aristotle just says that often (pollakis) 
these causes coincide, I agree with Bostock that this extends to all physical objects. 
Evidence for the generality is given in a27: kai holôs hosa kinoumena kinei. For 
Bostock, see his notes on Waterfield’s translation Aristotle—Physics, A New 
Translation by Robin Waterfield (Oxford 1996), 243. 
22. I agree with Leunissen when she writes: “It is through this efficient cause that the 
essence of thunder and thereby the formal explanation of why there is thunder are 
revealed: thunder is noise in the clouds caused by fire being extinguished.” 
[Explanations], 186–187. In the same manner, one can argue that the parent as the 
efficient cause reveals the essence of the offspring. This reasoning may rely on Physics 
III 2, 202a9–12, where the moving principle is said to always carry form. However, all 
these considerations do not recommend to us to consider the efficient cause as 
sufficient to explain a substance’s coming to be. 
23. As far as I can see, all scholars agree with Frede’s dictum that Aristotle uses aitia 
and aition without significant difference, see M. Frede 'The Original Notion of Cause’ 
in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (eds.) Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in 
Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980), 217–249, 220–223. Leunissen proposes Ana. 
post. I as the only exception where a distinction between both terms can be found, see 
her [Explanation], 180. 
24. Frede/Patzig write against the common reading with which I agree: “Warum soll 
nicht auch im Hinblick auf (schon oder noch) existierende Dinge nach deren 
wirkenden Ursachen gefragt werden können?” Aristotle does not deny this. However, 
when we ask for substance as the cause for coming to be and for being, this cause is 
the end. Why? Because only the purpose explains both why this matter is a house and 
why it became a house. If we take the moving principle explaining why a human being 
begets a human being, we can only do so because the moving principle, the formal 
cause, and the purpose are unified, see Physics II 7, 198a24–27. For Frede/Patzig see 
M. Frede/G. Patzig Aristoteles 'Metaphysik Z’, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar, 
vol. 2 (Munich 1988), 313. 
25. I tend to agree with Charles that in the case of substances, the moving principle 
is subordinated to the end. The end defines the form of a house and the form must be 
given in the soul of a housebilder so she can built a house, see [Definition], 294. For 
cases such as thunder, Leunissen seems to be right that the moving principle reveals 
the form: "It is through this efficient cause that the essence of thunder and thereby the 
formal explanation of why there is thunder are revealed: thunder is noise in the clouds 
caused by fire being extinguished.” [Explanations], 186–187. 
26. “Definition and Explanation in the Posterior Analytics (and beyond),” 311. 
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27.  I reject the idea that the case of syllables as it appears in the end of Zeta 17 is 
significant with respect to substances. As Burnyeat has rightly pointed out, “The 
syllable [...] is not a proper substantial being.” M. Burnyeat A Map of Metaphysics 
Zeta (Pittsburgh 2001), 61. In a similar way, Mann wrote: "Thus by the end of Z 17 it 
seems that syllables will not be ousiai, nor will there be an ousia of a syllable”, and 
later "[...] only individual ousiai have a genuinely internal principle of unity.”, W.–R. 
Mann â€ ˜Elements, Causes, and Principles’ in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
40 (2011), 29–61, 52 & 54. 
28.  Ross explains: “They indicate not the inmost nature of that to which they belong 
but a mode of arrangement or other characteristic which may be only temporary.” 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. ii, 229. 
29. Among other reasons, this may explain why Aristotle quickly rejects the idea that 
the soul is a mixture’s proportion. His own reasoning is terse and hard to understand, 
see De anima I 4, 407b27–408a18. Ross lists the arguments in Aristotle, De Anima. 
Edited with Introduction and Commentary by W.D. Ross (Oxford 1961), 192–193. For 
a discussion of Aristotle’s refutation, see W. Charlton “Aristotle and the Harmonia 
Theory” in A. Gotthelf (ed.) Aristotle on Nature and Living Things (Pittsburgh and 
Bristol 1985), 131–150. 
30. In Physics II 8, 199a7–8, we read that “the end is present in the things that come 
to be by nature and are by nature.” (ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις 
καὶ οὖσιν.) Remarkably, Aristotle mentions being by nature explicitly, which refers 
back to the beginning of Physics II, 192b8. As I take it, a thing’s nature is both its 
cause of being and its cause of coming to be. Note that 193a9–10 and a20 equate nature 
with substance. The physician has to work out the end as the natural object’s nature, 
we are told in 193a27–28 & 199a29–32. 
31. “Definition and Explanation in the Posterior Analytics (and beyond)”, 312. 
32. Ross still has the foregoing discussion on difference in mind when he translates ἤ 
τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον in a17 as “or add some other similar differentia.” To be a shelter for 
goods is definitely not a constitutive difference. For Ross, see The Complete Works of 
Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. by J. Barnes, vol. ii, 1646. Bostock 
ignores the introduction of the purpose in a14 when he summarizes Eta 2 thus: “And 
the chapter ends by recommending us to regard a definition as something that 
combines matter and differentia.” Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Z and H, 254. He 
renders the purpose as an addition only: “[Aristotle] adds in parenthesis that the 
purpose should be considered too.” 257. 
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